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NOTES AND COMMENTS
DURA’S EFFECT ON SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
Scotland M. Duncan*
ABSTRACT
On April 19, 2005, the United States Supreme Court rendered a
unanimous decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, which had been
described as “the most important securities case in a decade.” Simply put, the
decision raises the pleading standard for Rule 10b-5 cases asserting fraud-on-
the-market; instead of requiring a showing of ex ante losses, such as inflation
at the time of purchase, Dura requires a showing of ex post losses, such as
market decline resulting from a corrective disclosure. This paper assesses the
decision’s practical implications by examining and empirically testing
whether the Supreme Court’s enhanced pleading requirements have impacted
the frequency and magnitude of post-Reform Act (PSLRA) class action
securities cases. Specifically, this paper examines Dura’s effect on the filing
and settling of cases, as well as on settlement amount. In particular, the
results suggest that Dura, ceteris paribus, has had a statistically significant
impact on both the filing and settlement of class actions, suggesting a
reduction in frivolous litigation.
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1. Patti Waldmeir, Supreme Court to Rule on ‘Most Important Securities Case in a Decade’: The
Justices Will Decide Whether Shareholders Need to Lose Money Before They Can Sue a Company, Reports
Patti Waldmeir, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005, at 5.
2. John C. Coffee, Jr., Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone, 231 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2005)
[hereinafter Coffee, Something for Everyone].
3. See Richard A. Spehr & Joseph De Simone, The Battleground After ‘Dura’ Decision;
Differences Remain over Implementing Standard for Pleading Loss Causation, 234 N.Y. L.J. S6 (2005).
Compare Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2003)
(inflation of purchase price alone cannot satisfy loss causation), and Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d
165, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Where the value of the security does not actually decline as a result of an
alleged misrepresentation, it cannot be said that there is in fact an economic loss attributable to that
misrepresentation.”), and Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Rule 10b-5 has
been interpreted to authorize the creation of a federal common law of securities fraud, and common law
fraud is not actionable without proof of harm. No reason is given why Rule 10b-5 should be an exception
to this principle.”), and Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Our
decisions explicitly require proof of a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the investment’s
subsequent decline in value.”), with Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“[P]laintiffs were harmed when they paid more for the stock than it was worth. This is a sufficient
allegation.”), and Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]n a fraud-on-the-
market case, plaintiffs establish loss causation if they have shown that the price on the date of purchase
was inflated because of the misrepresentation.”) (quoting Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438
(9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original), rev’d, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
4. THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.11, at 507 (5th ed. 2005).
5. Id.
6. See Christopher J. Dutton, Note, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: Extracting Teeth from
Securities Regulation, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 153, 179 (2006).
INTRODUCTION
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo was expected to be the “most
important securities case in a decade.”  It was to be the seminal case in which1
the Supreme Court would define, clearly, the operative principles of “loss
causation.”  The decision was highly anticipated, in part because loss2
causation had been one of the most heavily litigated issues in securities
actions at the time, creating a split among the circuits.  In order to prove loss3
causation, plaintiffs must prove that their injury is directly attributable to both
the wrongful conduct and the form and manner in which the challenged
transaction occurred.  Loss causation provides the necessary connection4
between the challenged conduct and the plaintiff’s pecuniary loss.5
During the months preceding the April 2005 decision, many potential
litigants and corporate defendants postponed related procedures in anticipation
of the Court’s verdict.  For example, NERA, an economic consulting firm,6
suggested that the decline in federal filings in the first half of 2005 was due
to a sharp drop in Ninth Circuit filings, likely caused by plaintiffs’ firms
2008] DURA’S EFFECT ON SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 139
7. See Elaine Buckberg, Todd Foster & Ronald Miller, Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action
Litigation: Are WorldCom and Enron the New Standard?, NERA Economic Consulting, September 2005,
at 2 (“The drop in federal filings in the first six months of the year can be attributed to a sharp drop in Ninth
Circuit filings. It may be that plaintiffs’ firms in the Ninth Circuit chose to delay certain filings until after
the Dura decision by the Supreme Court in order to determine what they would need to do to plead loss
causation. . . . Ninth Circuit plaintiffs’ firms may file an unusually high number of cases in the remaining
months of 2005, including cases that they would otherwise have filed earlier in the year.”).
8. See Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 BUS. LAW.
507, 531 (2005) [hereinafter Fox, Demystifying Causation].
9. Id. at 519.
10. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject
Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533, 547 (2005) [hereinafter, Coffee, Phantom
Losses].
11. Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra note 8, at 520.
12. Id. at 525.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 530.
choosing to delay certain filings until after the Dura decision in order to
determine what was needed to plead loss causation.7
Commentators debated vigorously about how the Court should rule.
Professor Merritt Fox concurred with the Ninth Circuit’s decision merely
requiring plaintiffs to plead price inflation at the time of purchase.  Fox urged8
the Court to implement a “simple requirement, consistent with [the Court’s
earlier] reasoning in Basic[, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)] that the
plaintiff plead and prove that the defendant’s misstatement inflated the price
the plaintiff paid.”  In contrast, Professor John Coffee argued that the Court9
should adopt a heightened standard requiring market corroboration in the form
of a subsequent stock market decline.10
Fox’s position was based on an ex ante approach, under which courts
would use the “out of pocket” measure for damages, specifically, the
inflationary amount the purchaser paid as a result of the misstatement.  While11
admitting that the literal language of traditional loss causation is phrased in
terms of ex post loss, a less strict standard would block fewer meritorious
suits.  By focusing on the pleading stage, a mere allegation of a facially12
material misstatement would be sufficient, paving the way for more successful
pleading within fraud-on-the-market cases.  Adopting a traditional loss13
causation rule instead would arbitrarily cut out a portion of cases with merit,
such as those where the negative impact of a disclosed misstatement is
counterbalanced by positive news or where market realization, and thus
declines, occur prior to the public announcement.14
In opposition, Coffee argued for a literal ex post approach. Fearing that
the possibility of “phantom losses” and speculative court awards in an ex ante
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15. Coffee, Phantom Losses, supra note 10, at 546-47.
16. Id. at 533.
17. Id. at 535.
18. Id. at 537; see also Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra note 8, at 529. Coffee’s argument is
reinforced by the fact that both §§ 11(e) and 12(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 limit damages to
“depreciation in value.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77l(b) (2008).
19. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-46 (2005).
20. Id. at 347.
21. James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs to Lie More After Dura
Pharmaceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J. 653, 653 (2007) (arguing that the Dura rule fails to adequately internalize
the costs of fraud making it a profitable strategy).
22. Dura, 544 U.S. at 346 (conceding that “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only ‘a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”). See also Spehr &
De Simone, supra note 3 (noting that the Court did not expressly decide the issue as to whether Rule 8 or
9(b) applied; rather, it assumed, arguably, that the less restrictive notice pleading standard of Rule 8
applied, and dismissed the complaint under the more liberal standard).
23. Ann Morales Olazabal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases Post-Dura
Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 337, 380 (2006).
system might encourage frivolous litigation, Coffee embraced a bright line
rule requiring a decline in value because “[p]rice inflation that is never
corrected through a market decline is too hypothetical an injury.”  In essence,15
the market, and not the judicial system, should determine the extent of the
loss.  According to Coffee, to allow otherwise would force corporate16
defendants to act as insurers compensating shareholders for losses during a
class period that could be tenuously tied to any alleged misrepresentation
made.  Eliminating the requirement that plaintiffs plead a causal connection17
to a subsequent stock decline would lead to a larger number of fraud-on-the-
market actions than the traditional loss causation requirement.18
Ultimately, the Court sided with Professor Coffee, but not wholesale.
Rather, Justice Breyer delivered a minimalist text with a narrow holding that
an investor may not establish loss causation by merely alleging that a
defendant’s misrepresentations caused the price of a security to be artificially
inflated.  In addition, the pleadings must provide the defendant with “some19
indication of the loss and the causal connection the plaintiff has in mind.”20
Dura thus requires a plaintiff to show ex post losses in the form of a market
decline, as opposed to ex ante losses in the form of price inflation at the time
of purchase.  The decision does not impose a higher pleading standard on loss21
causation than that mandated by Rule 8(a)(2).  However, plaintiffs must abide22
by a “marginally stricter loss causation approach” that requires articulation of
the theory of their loss at the complaint stage.  This tightened pleading23
requirement “enables courts to separate out the cases that ought to enter
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24. Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 154 (2006).
25. Devin F. Ryan, Comment, Yet Another Bough on the “Judicial Oak”: The Second Circuit
Clarifies Inquiry Notice and its Loss Causation Requirement Under the PSLRA in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch
& Co., 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 485, 500 (2005).
26. See Jacob M. Kantrow, Note, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: Not Really a Loss
Causation Case, 67 LA. L. REV. 257, 275 (2006) (citing Jonathan C. Dickey, Robert F. Serio & Wayne W.
Smith, Supreme Court Reverses Ninth Circuit’s Loss Causation Standard, INSIGHTS, May 2005, at 20, 21
(2005)); see also, e.g., Jerod Neas, Note, Dura Duress: The Supreme Court Mandates a More Rigorous
Pleading and Proof Requirement for Loss Causation under Rule 10b-5 Class Actions, 78 U. COLO. L. REV.
347, 366 (2007) (writing that the Dura holding, in requiring “a particular showing of loss causation at the
pleading stage” has “imposed a much greater obstacle for plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 actions.”).
27. Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. 1547,1567-69 (2005) [hereinafter Fox,
Understanding Dura] (noting that the Court’s reasons for reaching this conclusion “appear to be rather
confused” and that its explanation of the situation where the purchaser does not sell until after the truth has
come out was “simply wrong”); Spindler, supra note 21, at 666 (explaining that “the Court’s reasoning is
confused”).
28. Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation under the Federal
Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 1 (2005) (asserting that the “Court’s decision is inconsistent with
the federal securities laws, incoherent in its reliance upon an amoebic notion of ‘economic loss,’ incomplete
in its failure to address pressing causation questions and, ultimately, inconsequential.”).
discovery, thereby minimizing the risk that defendants will have to settle
flimsy claims.”24
Some commentators have described the Dura decision as an imposition
of a “Herculean requirement”  for loss causation that will favor corporate25
defendants in a myriad of ways including reducing the damages claimed by
plaintiffs, the risk posed by securities actions, and the settlement value of
these actions.  Others have argued that, in failing to address loss causation in26
private securities fraud litigation, portions of the Court’s reasoning are
confused or simply wrong.  Another has ridiculed the decision as27
inconsistent, incoherent, incomplete, and, ultimately, inconsequential.28
This study examines whether these commentators were right; whether
Dura has reduced the amount of frivolous litigation or if it really is
inconsequential. Part I provides a brief history of the concept of loss causation
within the framework of Rule 10b-5 private securities fraud actions. Part II
introduces Dura’s factual background, procedural history, and inspects the
Court’s holding. Part III reviews commentary before and after the April 2005
decision including remarks from both sides of the bar. Part IV defines the
study’s hypotheses and examines the theory behind these suppositions. Part
V explains the data sources and sample selection process. Part VI introduces
summary statistics supporting the claim that, ceteris paribus, the Dura
decision has had a statistically significant impact on the frequency of federal
securities class action filings and appears to have reduced the number of
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29. E.g., id. (arguing that the “Court’s decision is . . . , ultimately, inconsequential.”).
30. Dura, 544 U.S. at 341.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
33. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (noting that “that
there was an implied private right of action under” Rule 10b-5).
34. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2008).
35. HAZEN, supra note 4, § 12.11, at 506.
36. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 n.24 (5th Cir. 1981)
(“‘[T]ransaction causation’ is used to describe the requirement that the defendant’s fraud must precipitate
the investment decision.”).
37. See, e.g., Dura, 544 U.S. at 342; Ribstein, supra note 24, at 150 (“[P]laintiff must show that
defendant’s fraud caused . . . her specific loss—that is, . . . loss causation.”).
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2008) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, the
plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this
frivolous settlements. Part VII concludes the study. Ultimately, this analysis
demonstrates that Dura has had a significant impact, but not necessarily in the
ways predicted by commentators.29
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LOSS CAUSATION
Private securities fraud actions are based upon federal securities statutes
and their implementing regulations.  Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange30
Act of 1934 makes it unlawful to “use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . , any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of” the rules and regulations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.  SEC Rule 10b-5 forbids, inter alia, “any untrue31
statement of a material fact” or the omission of “a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made . . . not misleading.”  Courts have implied32
from Rule 10b-5 a private right of action  and Congress has imposed statutory33
requirements on that private action.34
Causation in securities cases is analyzed according to a judicial rubric.
Courts have formulated two categories: “transaction causation” and “loss
causation.”  Transaction causation requires a plaintiff to prove that he would35
not have purchased “but for” the misstatement.  Loss causation connects a36
defendant’s fraud with a specific loss, functioning as a proximate cause
requirement, designed to protect defendants from market fluctuations
unrelated to their challenged conduct.37
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)
expressly codified loss causation. Specifically, the PSLRA made loss
causation an element of a private suit for securities fraud.  According to38
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chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”).
39. Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted).
40. Isquith v. Caremark Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 1998).
41. See Pasley v. Freeman, (1789) 3 T.R. 51, 65, 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 457 (“[If] no injury is
occasioned by the lie, it is not actionable . . . attended with a damage, it then becomes the subject of an
action.”). See also Dura, 544 U.S. at 344 (highlighting several cases and treatises regarding the common
law requirement of loss causation).
42. Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra note 8, at 515.
43. See id.; see also supra note 3.
44. Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra note 8, at 509-10. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418
F.2d 1276, 1291-92 (2d Cir. 1969) (The instructions were that “the plaintiff is required to prove . . . that
he or she suffered damages as a proximate result of the alleged misleading statements and purchase of stock
in reliance to them. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the misleading statement or omission played
a substantial part in bringing about or causing the damage suffered by him or her and that the damage was
either a direct result or a reasonably foreseeable result of the misleading statement.”).
45. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974).
46. Id.
47. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra note 8, at 510-11.
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, “what securities lawyers call ‘loss
causation’ is the standard common law fraud rule . . . merely borrowed for use
in federal securities cases.”  In securities cases the term “loss causation”39
generally refers to the “loss produced by a discrepancy between the actual
market value of a stock and what the value would have been had there been
no misrepresentation.”40
Establishing “loss causation” has long been a part of the common law.41
Courts created the loss causation element as a means of restricting liability,
of requiring “something more” than just transaction causation.  Prior to Dura,42
the Supreme Court had never discussed the matter, which had been heavily
debated by the lower courts.43
The requirement of something more first appeared in 1969 in Globus v.
Law Research Service, Inc., when the Second Circuit held that the challenged
jury instructions on causation were sufficient since the instructions called for
more than just a showing of “but for” causation (now referred to as transaction
causation).  In 1974, in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., the Second44
Circuit adopted the terms “loss causation” and “transaction causation.”  Loss45
causation was defined as a showing that a defendant’s “misrepresentations or
omissions caused the economic harm,” which could be “demonstrated rather
easily by proof of some form of economic damage.”  Ultimately, the Fifth46
Circuit in Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean  provided a clear appellate47
court ruling that a showing of something more was required.  “The plaintiff48
must prove not only that, had he known the truth, he would not have acted, but
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49. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549.
50. Id. at 549 n.24. See MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION DAMAGES § 11.1 (West
2004) (“The notion that a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct caused his losses
is unremarkable. Yet, Huddleston’s language goes farther. The Court declares: ‘The causation requirement
is satisfied in a rule 10b-5 case only if the misrepresentation touches upon the reasons for the investment’s
decline in value.’ Under this formulation of loss causation, the federal courts have required plaintiffs to
prove that the misrepresentation caused all of the investment’s decline in value before they can recover any
loss at all. This is remarkable.”).
51. Cf. Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra note 8, at 515 (“Remember that the loss causation
requirement is a follow on to transaction causation.”).
52. Id.
53. Dura, 544 U.S. at 345.
54. Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes-of-Action:
The Implication of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, at 12 (Harv. Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No.
08/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006088.
55. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & ALAN J. MARCUS, FUNDAMENTALS
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 698-701 (3d ed. 2001).
56. Ferrell & Saha, supra note 54, at 12.
57. Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc.,
1999 WL 34771282 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 1999) (No. 99 Civ. 0151).
in addition that the untruth was in some reasonably direct, or proximate, way
responsible for his loss.”  Loss causation, the court added, “refers to a direct49
causal link between the misstatement and the claimant’s economic loss.”50
Loss causation is more precise than transaction causation.  If only a51
showing of inducement based on a misstatement or omission is required, the
plaintiff would be insured from any risk that could possibly depress price
below the purchase price, including risks wholly unrelated to the
misstatement.  Permitting allegations of mere price inflation thus would52
convert Rule 10b-5 into a scheme of investors’ insurance.  Such insurance53
would effectively modify the risk characteristics for investors speculating on
changes in general market, or macroeconomic, conditions.  As a result, a54
policy without loss causation would be tantamount to granting investors a
protective put option,  or downside protection, should the stock price decline55
without a corrective disclosure establishing the necessary link between
economic loss and actionable conduct by the defendant.56
II. DURA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. BROUDO
A. Background and Procedural History
On January 27, 1999, a class of plaintiffs commenced suit against Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Dura”).  The plaintiff class comprised investors who57
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58. Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
59. Dura, 544 U.S. at 339.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 936.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Dura, 544 U.S. at 339.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 340.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938 (holding that loss causation “merely requires pleading that the price
at the time of purchase was overstated and sufficient identification of the cause”).
had purchased securities of Dura between April 15, 1997 and February 24,
1998.  The suit named Dura, several of its managers, and directors as58
defendants.  The complaint alleged that Dura made false statements59
concerning both the company’s drug profits and future Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) approval of a new asthmatic spray device during the
relevant period.  More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the Company60
falsely claimed that it expected its drug sales to prove profitable and that the
FDA would soon approve the asthmatic device.  On February 24, 1998, Dura61
announced that its earnings would be lower than expected due in part to slow
drug sales.  As a result, the Company’s shares declined in value by 47% the62
following day.  Then, in November 1998, Dura revealed that the FDA would63
not approve the asthmatic device due to reliability issues and other concerns.64
The next day the Company’s share price temporarily declined, but almost fully
recovered within a week.65
Plaintiffs filed several class actions, which were consolidated, alleging
violations of §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange
Act”) and Rule 10b-5.  The complaint claimed, with respect to the spray66
device statements, that the plaintiffs had relied “on the integrity of the market”
and “paid artificially inflated prices for Dura securities” that resulted in
damages.  The District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed67
the complaint on the basis that the allegations of loss causation were
inadequate.68
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.  Siding with the69
Second and Eighth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit held that loss causation could
be satisfied by allegations that defendants’ misrepresentations or omissions
caused the investor to purchase securities at an artificial price.  However, as70
the Supreme Court later points out in Dura, the Second Circuit rejected the
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71. Dura, 544 U.S. at 344; see also Emergent, 343 F.3d at 198 (“[I]nflation of purchase price alone
cannot satisfy loss causation.”).
72. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938 (noting that “other circuits are less favorable to plaintiffs and do require
demonstration of a corrective disclosure followed by a stock price drop to be alleged in the complaint”).
73. Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997).
74. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2000).
75. Dura, 544 U.S. at 340.
76. Id. at 348.
77. Id. at 342.
78. Id. (emphasis in original).
79. Id.
Ninth Circuit’s “inflated purchase price” approach to loss causation shortly
after Broudo was filed in 2003.71
The Ninth Circuit’s holding, the court recognized, conflicted with the
position held by the Third and Eleventh Circuits that required demonstration
of a corrective disclosure followed by a subsequent stock price decline.72
According to the Eleventh Circuit, loss causation requires plaintiffs to give
“proof of a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the
investment’s subsequent decline in value.”  Similarly, the Third Circuit held73
that, “where the claimed loss involves the purchase of a security due to an
alleged misrepresentation, there is a sufficient causal nexus between the loss
and the alleged misrepresentation to satisfy the loss causation requirement,”
provided “that the artificial inflation was actually ‘lost’ due to the alleged
fraud.”74
B. Court’s Holding
To resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  In a75
unanimous opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s judgment.  According to the Court, mere allegation and proof76
of an inflated purchase price “will not itself constitute or proximately cause
the relevant economic loss” in fraud-on-the-market cases.  This is because,77
at the time of purchase, “the plaintiff has suffered no loss” since “the inflated
purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant
possesses equivalent value.”  “Moreover, the logical link between the inflated78
share purchase price and any later economic loss is not invariably strong . . .
if, say, the purchaser sells the shares quickly before the relevant truth begins
to leak out, the misrepresentation will not have led to any loss.”  Rather, a79
plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentation actually did
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80. Id. at 343 (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at 347-48.
82. Id. at 341, 343-44 (noting that “the common law has long insisted that a plaintiff in such a case
show . . . that he suffered actual economic loss”).
83. Id. at 344 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A cmt. b (1977)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 345-46 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2008)).
86. Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 347.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 298, 301 (S.D.N.Y. June 28,
2005) (“Dura did not establish what would be a sufficient loss causation pleading standard; it merely
established what was not.”) (emphasis in original); Olazabal, supra note 23, at 341.
“cause a loss.”  To hold otherwise “would permit a plaintiff ‘with a largely80
groundless claim . . . representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement
value’” to transform a private securities action into a partial downside
insurance policy.  The Court’s concern with the abusive practice of frivolous81
suits is one theme this study explores in more detail, infra Parts III and IV.
This actual loss requirement for private securities fraud actions is based
on an analogy to the common-law tort actions for deceit and
misrepresentation.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts refers to the loss82
sustained by a purchaser as occurring when the facts surrounding a
misrepresentation become known and the share value depreciates.  The Court83
noted that the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits all require
something more than “the Ninth Circuit’s ‘inflated purchase price’ approach
to proving causation and loss.”  The PSLRA imposes on plaintiffs the burden84
of proving that the defendant’s misrepresentations caused the loss for which
the plaintiff seeks to recover.  Having held that “plaintiffs need to prove85
proximate causation and economic loss” the Court determined that the
plaintiffs’ “complaint here failed adequately to allege these requirements.”86
In doing so, the Court stressed that the pleading requirements “should not
prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss . . . .”87
Plaintiffs, they said, need only “provide a defendant with some indication of
the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”88
III. COMMENTARY ON DURA’S HOLDING
While Dura was expected to clear up the confused state of loss causation
jurisprudence in the circuits, the Court declined to articulate a clear loss
causation standard.  Critics of the opinion contend that the Court’s rationale,89
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90. E.g., Fox, Understanding Dura, supra note 27, at 1567-69 (2005) (noting that the Court’s
reasons for reaching this conclusion “appear to be rather confused” and that their explanation of the
situation where the purchaser does not sell until after the truth has come out was “simply wrong”); Spindler,
supra note 21, at 666 (explaining that “the Court’s reasoning is confused . . . .”).
91. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986).
92. Fox, Understanding Dura, supra note 27, at 1568.
93. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342 (emphasis in original).
94. Fox, Understanding Dura, supra note 27, at 1569.
95. Id.
96. See Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra note 8, at 507. See also Spehr & De Simone, supra note
3, at S6 (noting that “the Dura decision appeared to be a significant victory for the defense bar”).
97. Patrick J. Coughlin, Eric Alan Isaacson & Joseph D. Daley, What’s Brewing in Dura v. Broudo?
The Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Review the Supreme Court’s Opinion and its Import for Securities-Fraud
Litigation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2 (2005).
98. Id. at 2.
99. Latham & Watkins, Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals Unanimously Endorses “Loss
Causation” Requirement in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases, Client Alert No. 455, Apr. 28, 2005, at 1,
available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1258_1.pdf.
100. Richard A. Rosen, Pleading and Proving “Loss Causation” after Dura Pharmaceuticals: What’s
Happening in the Lower Courts?, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 48, at 2043 (Dec. 12, 2005) (observing
“[a]rguments that a complaint fails to allege loss causation now feature prominently in motions to
dismiss.”). See, e.g., Garber v. Legg Mason, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 597, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (failure to
when scrutinized, appears confused and, at times, simply wrong.  Fox argues90
that the Court’s suggestion that a share’s value equals its price contradicts its
own jurisprudence on damages,  which employs the “out of pocket” measure,91
or the extra amount that the plaintiff pays at the time of purchase because of
the misstatement.  If a share’s value always equals its price there can never92
be an excess amount paid due to a misrepresentation or omission. Fox also
challenges the Court’s argument that a sale after disclosure of the truth “might
mean a later loss,”  noting that such a statement flies in the face of the93
foundation of fraud-on-the-market theory, the efficient market hypothesis.94
Under the efficient market hypothesis once the truth is revealed the inflated
price will inevitably result in a loss.95
Representatives of both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ bar claimed Dura
as a victory.  Patrick Coughlin, the plaintiffs’ attorney in Dura, stated that96
despite the adverse outcome, the Court’s ruling was not hostile to investors;97
on the contrary, the Court had adopted sensible rules for pleading and proving
loss causation that would be less burdensome for investors.  On the flip-side,98
a member of the defendant’s bar greeted the decision as one that “closes the
door to what could have been a flood of speculative new lawsuits for recovery
of stock losses unrelated to the defendant’s alleged fraud.”99
Defendants have quickly seized on Dura. Arguments that complaints fail
to allege loss causation now feature prominently in motions to dismiss.  As100
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plead loss causation as an independent basis for dismissing plaintiffs’ claims); Lopes v. Vieira, 543 F.
Supp. 2d 1149, 1193 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (concluding that “our holding about plaintiffs’ need to prove
proximate causation and economic loss leads us also to conclude that the plaintiffs’ complaint here failed
to adequately allege these requirements”) (emphasis in original); 60223 Trust v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
540 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (granting motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
fails to adequately plead loss causation).
101. Spindler, supra note 21, at 665.
102. Id. at 671.
103. Id. at 672-73.
104. Coffee, Something for Everyone, supra note 2 (concluding that “Dura Pharmaceuticals is a
decision that has something for everyone”).
105. Id. (mentioning the Court’s dictum in which they do not consider the case where a share’s higher
price is lower than it would otherwise have been creates the danger of “phantom losses”).
106. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation: New Doctrine Spawns New Tactics, 235 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2006)
[hereinafter Coffee, Litigation].
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 100, at 2043 (noting that “a plaintiff must plead and prove that ‘the
truth became known’ before the stock price drop from which the plaintiff claims a loss”).
a practical matter, since claims unaccompanied by a market decline are readily
dismissible, Dura’s ex post measure may reduce the number of frivolous
lawsuit filings, thereby resulting in administrative ease.  A limited study of101
cases from the time Dura was decided through June 2006 found that all cases
in which loss causation was satisfied pointed to an absolute price decline
following disclosure of the truth.  In cases in which loss causation was not102
satisfied, plaintiffs alleged mere price inflation or alleged an absolute decline
but still failed for reasons such as an inability to link the decline to the
corrective disclosure.103
Arguably, Dura has something for both sides of the bar.  According to104
Coffee, Dura favors plaintiffs in its suggestion that price inflation can be
recovered when the stock fails to rise and in its relaxed pleading standard for
proximate causation.  On the other hand, Coffee also asserts that the real105
significance of Dura is that defendants can now scale back the class at the
outset of litigation, thereby improving their position in settlement
negotiations.  Prior to Dura, individuals who purchased and sold shares for106
a loss during the class period, but prior to any corrective disclosure, could
litigate their loss as part of the damages determination.  Dura explicitly107
disallows any stock price decline that precedes a corrective announcement by
a defendant.  As a result, plaintiffs have smaller potential damages estimates108
that translate into less leverage during settlement negotiations. Generally,
plaintiffs have a large economic incentive to plead the longest class period,
typically encompassing the date when the issuer’s share price peaked, so that
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109. Id. at 2048 (which “[n]ot only yields a class that is larger in absolute terms . . . but the longer
class period will often encompass the date when the issuer’s share price was at its peak”).
110. See id.; Dura, 544 U.S. at 342-43 (noting that “when the purchaser subsequently resells such
shares, even at a lower price, that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts,
conditions or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower price”).
111. Steven J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (2004).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437
(1988) (noting that “the negative expected value of litigation might not deter the plaintiff from suing”);
Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
3, 25 (1990) (concluding that “[b]ecause the defendant does not know whether a given lawsuit is frivolous
or genuine, he may choose a strategy that leads to the settlement of frivolous claims”).
115. Choi, supra note 111, at 1467.
116. Id. at 1477 & n.36.
117. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
the plaintiff class is maximized.  Such a tactic increases potential damages109
estimates and provides greater leverage in settlement discussions. But as Dura
recognized, the longer the period between the purchase and sale, the more
likely that the alleged loss may be due to other factors.110
IV. HYPOTHESES
A. Filings
In theory, class actions ameliorate the collective action problem
confronting shareholders.  Rather than pursue individual actions, which can111
be prohibitively expensive, the class can pursue a single action.  Strong112
pressure from both plaintiffs and defendants to settle has caused some
commentators to argue that plaintiffs’ attorneys have a strong incentive to file
frivolous lawsuits,  even when the expected value of litigation is negative.113 114
The large market capitalizations of many firms combined with high trading
volumes can lead to potentially high damage awards and provides further
incentive to plaintiffs’ counsel to pursue numerous class actions annually.115
This study does not delve into specific allegations in an attempt to
distinguish cases with merit from those that are frivolous. The determination
of a lawsuit’s merit or frivolity is difficult to assess, in part because plaintiffs’
attorneys are not likely to admit to filing frivolous lawsuits.  Frivolous suits,116
often referred to as “strike suits,” are defined by the Court as an action that is
brought “not to redress real [corporate] wrongs, but to realize upon their
nuisance value” through settlement.  As noted in Dura, these largely117
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118. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347.
119. Choi, supra note 111, at 1466.
120. See generally Choi, supra note 111, at 1477-99. See, e.g., D. Katherine Spiess et al., The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: The Stock Market Casts its Vote . . . , 18 MGMT. DEC. ECON. 545,
554 (1997) (finding that an entire sample of firms experienced a significant negative abnormal return on
December 18, 1995, a date that corresponded to rumors that President Clinton would veto the PSLRA);
Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991)
(testing the hypothesis that litigation acts as an ex-post mechanism to discipline managers of companies
with relatively weak ex-ante corporate governance control); James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the
New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1996) (using
regression analysis to test whether the incidence of litigation as well as settlement outcomes are driven by
factors related to the merits of the litigation).
121. Mukesh Bajaj et al., Securities Class Action Settlements, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1001,
1002-03 (2003).
122. Id. at 1003.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Choi, supra note 111, at 1496.
groundless claims represent no more than an “in terrorem increment of the
settlement value”  “in which the plaintiffs have no expectation of finding any118
evidence of fraud or culpability on the part of defendants.”  Tests of the119
incidence of frivolous litigation have focused on a number of indirect
measures such as the use of event studies, examining corporate governance
changes, and exploration of the filing of suit and settlement outcomes.  The120
present study uses the latter method, similar in some respects to a 2003 study
by Bajaj, Muzumdar, and Sarin that provided analysis of summary statistics
related to securities filing and settlement data to examine trends following the
passage of the PSLRA.121
Bajaj et al. examined both filing and settlement data obtained from
Securities Class Action Alert from 1988 to 1999.  Using a sample of 2,167122
federal court securities filings, the Bajaj study found that federal court filings
dropped immediately following the passage of the PSLRA.  Markedly,123
federal court filings went from 191 in 1995 down to 119 filings in 1996, a
39% decline in one year.  These results “are consistent with the hypothesis124
that post-PSLRA, plaintiffs’ attorneys shifted their focus toward cases where
fraud is more easily proven, avoiding more ambiguous instances of fraud that
may cost more to prosecute and face a higher risk of dismissal pursuant to the
heightened pleading requirements under the PSLRA.”125
With respect to class action filings, this study hypothesizes that post-Dura
plaintiffs’ attorneys have again narrowed their focus to cases with market
corroboration in the form of a price decline subsequent to a corrective
disclosure. As such, it is likely that the number of frivolous filings, and thus
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126. Spindler, supra note 21, at 665-66.
127. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 111, at 1472.
128. Id. (noting that this is especially true for companies that have small market capitalizations). The
stricter pleading requirement forces plaintiffs to engage in a higher degree of preparation before filing suit.
For example, in cases where price falls prematurely, after the false statement but prior to any corrective
statement made by the company, plaintiffs’ counsel will have to employ more careful pleading. Another
example requiring more care and preparation before filing would occur where the market does not react,
or reacts modestly after the corrective announcement, followed later by a larger price decline. Dura thus
arguably raises the cost of bringing frivolous claims relative to valid ones and may raise the average merit
of cases brought. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 114, at 16; Coffee, Litigation, supra note 106, at 1.
129. Katz, supra note 114, at 16.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 17.
132. Id.
133. Id.
the total number of class action filings, have declined following the Court’s
decision. These anticipated declines are most likely to occur in jurisdictions,
like the Ninth Circuit, that permitted a relaxed pleading standard for loss
causation.
Dura moves exclusively to an ex post loss rule, which James Spindler
posits may result in fewer frivolous lawsuits being filed, since claims
unaccompanied by hard market evidence of price declines are readily
dismissible.  And while Dura’s standard is suited to reduce the impact of126
frivolous litigation, the decision also may have chilled meritorious cases;127
this is because Dura raises the expected costs of litigation while diminishing
the probability of success, thereby diminishing the number of cases in which
the expected return will justify filing suit.  Since the stricter pleading128
requirements would reduce the amount of preparation later needed at trial, the
Dura rule does not necessarily change the total cost of litigation for genuine
plaintiffs.  In other words, costs initially incurred by plaintiffs with129
meritorious claims would arguably result in reduced costs needed in the
eventual preparation for trial. Total costs of litigation stay the same; the
stricter requirement simply increases the fraction of total costs initially
incurred.  A model by Avery Katz found that increasing the fraction of total130
litigation costs incurred when filing (one result of stricter proof and pleading
requirements) results in a reduction of “strike” or frivolous suits.  Settlement131
becomes more frequent as costs are shifted toward the beginning of the
lawsuit,  as the Dura holding arguably does. Thus, a stricter pleading rule,132
like the one in Dura, has no effect on total expected costs because such a rule
reduces the number of strike suits and trials, increases the costs in all suits that
settle before trial, and the three effects balance precisely.133
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134. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlement in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 528 (1991) (noting that substantive and procedural rules,
relationships among the parties, the lawyers on both sides, and the insurance carriers all encourage
settlement of securities law class action suits).
135. Coffee, Phantom Losses, supra note 10, at 540.
136. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2064
(1995) (noting that “if a class action survives motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment,
though, it is practically certain to result in a fee award to the attorneys for the plaintiff class”).
137. Coffee, Phantom Losses, supra note 10, at 540.
138. Id. at 543.
139. Id.
140. See Bajaj et al., supra note 121, at 1012-31.
141. Id. at 1010.
142. See Choi, supra note 111, at 1497.
143. Id. at 1022-23 (noting that “the mean settlement amount for the pre-PSLRA period is $8.01
million, compared to $18.09 million in the post-PSLRA period. Similarly, the median settlement is $3.5
million in the pre-PSLRA period compared to $4.24 million in the post-PSLRA period”) (citation omitted).
B. Settlements
Private securities class actions produce strong incentives for both sides
to avoid trial.  Cases that survive pretrial dismissal tend to be settled.  In134 135
other words, plaintiffs need only survive a motion to dismiss to gain financial
reward.  Accordingly, there is a very real incentive for plaintiffs to file strike136
suits. Professor Coffee suggested that if the Ninth Circuit’s Broudo rule had
been affirmed by the Supreme Court, more specifically Professor Fox’s
interpretation of it, it would have been “adverse to defendants and would have
raised the settlement value of securities class actions.”  In expanding upon137
that argument, Professor Coffee claims that “to the extent causation is
presumed based only on a showing of materiality, the likelihood grows that
cases will settle for substantial recoveries where the actual cause of the stock
market decline [is] unrelated.”  He contends that such costs would fall like138
a tax on all shareholders as unfocused deterrence would do more harm than
good.139
As a reference point, the Bajaj et al. study on PSLRA settlements  found140
that the fraction of cases settling within 4 years of the filing date dropped from
57.59% pre-PSLRA to 26.06% after the passage of the Act, a 55% decline.141
The lower frequency of quick settlements post-PSLRA arguably provides
some evidence that frivolous suits were reduced because of the enactment of
the legislation.  In further examination of settlement amounts, Bajaj et al.142
found higher mean and median settlement amounts post-PSLRA.143
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144. Id. at 1012.
145. See Choi, supra note 111, at 1497.
146. Id.
147. The Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse in cooperation with
Cornerstone Research, http://securities.stanford.edu/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2008). “The Stanford Law School
Class Action Clearinghouse, in cooperation with Cornerstone Research, tracks the content of the first-
identified class action complaints in addition to the level of filing activity.” The information is publicly
available. See also Securities Class Action Case Filings: 2007 A Year in Review, Cornerstone Research
2008, at 20, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2007_YIR/20080103-01.pdf.
148. See http://securities.stanford.edu/.
149. Data is limited to a two-year period before and after the decision due to restrictions on the
settlement data requested from Cornerstone Research by the author. At the time of the request, settlements
data was only available through April 2007. To maintain consistency with the filings data, it too is limited
to 2 years before, and after the decision. 
150. See http://securities.stanford.edu/.
151. Id.
Additionally, the mean and median settlement amounts increased as the
amount of time between filing and settlement increased.  Cases settling144
within one year of filing, possibly representing frivolous suits, thus tended to
settle for the lowest amount of money.  Such a finding supports the145
hypothesis that defendants settle such suits quickly to rid themselves of the
nuisance and associated costs of defending such a suit.146
Predicting similar findings, this study hypothesizes a drop in the number
of frivolous settlements following the Dura decision. More specifically, a
proxy for frivolous settlements—i.e., cases settling for smaller amounts
relatively quickly—should decline. Accordingly, this hypothesis would result
in an increase in the average and median settlements post-Dura, a reduction
in the number of smaller settlements, and a decline in the number of filings
settling relatively quickly.
V. SAMPLE SELECTION
The federal filings data in this study come from the Stanford Law School
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (“Clearinghouse”) in cooperation with
Cornerstone Research.  The Clearinghouse maintains an index of filings of147
named issuers in federal class action securities fraud lawsuits since the
passage of the PSLRA.  This study examines the 4-year period148 149
surrounding the April 2005 Dura decision, a “classic” filing as defined by the
Clearinghouse.  “Classic” cases exclude “IPO Allocation,” “Analyst,” and150
“Mutual Fund” filings.  This subset was chosen because the original Dura151
complaint, filed January 27, 1999 in the Southern District of California, was
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152. Id.
153. Cornerstone Research, http://www.cornerstone.com/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
154. Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Securities Class Action Settlements 2006 Review and
Analysis, Cornerstone Research, 2007, at 19, available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/
settlements_2006.pdf (explaining that “[i]n addition to the SCAS, data sources include Factiva, Bloomberg,
the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago, Standard & Poor’s Compustat,
court filings and dockets, SEC registrant filings, SEC litigation releases and administrative proceedings,
LEXIS-NEXIS, and the public press”).
155. Id.
classified by the Clearinghouse as a “classic” case. As Table 1 demonstrates,
there were 119 “classic” federal securities class actions filed from April 20,
2003 through the end of 2003, 215 filed in 2004, 178 in 2005, 116 in 2006,
and 39 filed in 2007 through April 19, 2007.  Thus, the initial filing sample152
for the 4-year period surrounding the Dura decision (2 years prior, 2 years
after) contains 667 filings for federal securities class actions.
TABLE 1
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS
Time Period Filings
4/20/03 - 12/31/03 119
1/1/04 - 12/31/04 215
1/1/05 - 12/31/05 178
1/1/06 - 12/31/06 116
1/1/07 - 4/19/07 39
Total 667
The settlements data come from a proprietary database prepared by
Cornerstone Research, a consulting firm that provides economic and financial
analysis in commercial litigation and regulatory proceedings.  Institutional153
Shareholder Services’ Securities Class Action Services (“SCAS”) originally
identified the sample of cases prepared by Cornerstone Research.154
Cornerstone has limited the larger set of cases identified by SCAS to cases
alleging fraudulent inflation in the price of a corporation’s common stock (i.e.,
excluding cases filed by bondholders, preferred stockholders, etc.).  In155
addition, their database is limited to cases alleging Rule 10b-5, Section 11,
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156. Id.
157. Id. at 1.
158. Id. at 20 n.5 (“For a settlement to be included in a more recent year, the subsequent partial
settlement must be at least 50% of the original settlement.”)
159. Id.
160. Id. at 19 (“In addition to the SCAS, data sources include Factiva, Bloomberg, the Center for
Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago, Standard & Poor’s Compustat, court filings and
dockets, SEC registrant filings, SEC litigation releases and administrative proceedings, LEXIS-NEXIS, and
the public press.”).
161. E.g., Kaufman, supra note 28, at 42.
and/or Section 12(a)(2) claims brought by purchasers of common stock.156
Cornerstone assigns settlements to a particular year based upon the settlement
hearing date.  In the instance of partial settlements, or installments, the157
settlement hearing date is the date the first settlement was approved unless the
subsequent partial settlements are in excess of 50% of the then-current
settlement fund total.  Under these circumstances, the settlement hearing158
date is the date that the subsequent partial settlement was approved.159
Cornerstone tracks and gathers a multitude of qualitative and quantitative
variables using data from a myriad of sources.  This paper focuses upon the160
magnitude and frequency of settlements surrounding the Dura decision using
three variables: class action filing date, settlement hearing date, and settlement
amount.
For the purposes of this study, the present settlements data set is limited
to cases alleging Rule 10b-5 claims brought by purchasers of a corporation’s
common stock. This ensures homogeneity because Dura was a Rule 10b-5
case with a narrow holding that concerned only claims brought by purchasers
of securities who pursue private securities fraud claims under the PSLRA
based upon fraud-on-the-market claims.  Limiting Cornerstone’s settlements161
database to cases alleging Rule 10b-5 claims yields 398 cases with settlement
hearing dates ranging from April 20, 2003 through April 19, 2007. The $7.2
billion Enron and $6.2 billion dollar WorldCom settlements were excluded
from the analysis as they are the two largest settlements in history and would
heavily skew the settlement averages presented here.
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162. “Classic,” as defined by the Clearinghouse. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
163. Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 936
(June 28, 2004), rev’d, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
VI. SUMMARY STATISTICS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Filings
During the pre-Dura time period, from April 20, 2003 through April 19,
2005, 400 classic  securities class actions were filed using data from the162
Clearinghouse. During the post-Dura period, from April 20, 2005 through
April 19, 2007, 267 classic securities class actions were filed, a decline of
more than 33% from the corresponding period. As Figure 1 demonstrates
below, there were 224 filings in the year preceding Dura, and just 149 filings
the year after the decision. More specifically, there were 125 filings from
April 20, 2004 through October 19, 2004, 99 filings from October 20, 2004
through April 19, 2005, 88 filings from April 20, 2005 through October 19,
2005, and 61 filings from October 20, 2005 through April 19, 2006. Generally,
aggregate 6-month filing rates exhibit an upward trend from April 2003
through late 2004 before declining slightly prior to the Dura decision and
continuing to trend downward over the next two years. The decline prior to the
decision is likely explained by the progression of the case, beginning with the
Court granting the petition for writ of certiorari on June 28, 2004.163
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164. Kaufman, supra note 28, at 5-6 (“Even in those cases in which Dura does apply, the Court’s new
loss causation standard will prove to be inconsequential because that standard can be easily satisfied. . . .”).
FIGURE 1
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS
TOTAL FILINGS AGGREGATED EVERY 6  M ONTHS
Despite commentary that Dura’s loss causation standard should prove
inconsequential because it is easily satisfied,  federal filings data164
demonstrates otherwise. Using the same Clearinghouse data incorporated in
Figure 1, Table 2 explores the number of class action filings two years, one
year, and six months before and after Dura, contrasting the comparable
periods. For each of the respective periods, the number of federal filings
declined.
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165. Where t = 4/19/2005, the date of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). The decline column compares the six months before with the six months
after the decision, one year before with one year after, and two years before with two years after the
decision.
166. To test whether the average monthly filings during the pre- and post-Dura periods are
statistically similar I set up the hypothesis that the mean score is identical for the two populations, in other
words that the difference between the average number of monthly filings before and after the decision is
equal to zero. Two-tailed, two-sample with equal variance t-tests comparing means of monthly filing data
between the pre- and post-Dura time frames proved significant at p < 0.05 (*) and p < 0.001 (***) for the
one and two year time frames, respectively. p-value, or probability value, is a number that reflects the
likelihood that statistical results have occurred by chance. Results with p-values equal to or less than .05
(*), .01(**) or .001(***) are labeled as statistically significant. See generally DUNCAN CRAMER, BASIC
STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 180-89 (1997).
167. See supra Part IV.
TABLE 2165





t - 2 years 400
t - 1 year 224
t - 0.5 year 99
t + 0.5 year 88 -11.11%
t + 1 year 149   -33.48%*
t + 2 years 267       -33.25%***
Table 2 indicates that Dura has had a statistically significant impact on
the overall number of class actions filed, reducing filings by a third for the one
and two year time frames.  Figure 1 and Table 2 collectively indicate, ceteris166
paribus, that Dura has caused a reduction in the number of securities class
actions filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys. These results support the hypothesis that
post-Dura plaintiffs’ attorneys have shifted focus, avoiding more ambiguous
instances of fraud.  In other words, it is likely that the Dura rule is resulting167
in the avoidance of cases lacking market corroboration in the form of a price
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168. See Choi, supra note 111, at 1496.
169. See supra note 165.
decline that would face a higher risk of dismissal pursuant to the enhanced
pleading requirements mandated by the Supreme Court.168
The majority of federal cases filed during the present study occurred in
the Ninth Circuit, followed by the Second Circuit. Table 3 shows the severe
decline in Ninth Circuit filings that immediately followed Dura.
TABLE 3169






t - 2 years 114
t - 1 year 77
t - 0.5 year 34
t + 0.5 year 9 -73.53%*
t + 1 year 19     -75.32%**††
t + 2 years 56     -50.88%**††
In the Ninth Circuit, 114 securities class actions were filed from April 20,
2003 through April 19, 2005 (the pre-Dura period). From April 20, 2005
through April 19, 2007 (the post-Dura period), only 56 class actions were
filed in the Ninth Circuit, a decline of more than 50% from the corresponding
time period. Strikingly, in the six months prior to Dura, there were 34
securities class action filings in the Ninth Circuit. In the six months following
the Court’s holding, which overturned the Ninth Circuit’s relaxed pleading
requirement, the number of filings dropped by 73.53% to just 9. Comparisons
of the monthly filings rate during the pre- and post-Dura time periods shows
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170. Two-tailed, t-tests for two samples with unequal variance were significant at p < 0.05 (“*”),
p < 0.01 (“**”), and p < 0.01 (“**”) for the six month, one year, and two year time frames, respectively.
In addition, F tests, used to return the one-tailed probability that the variances in monthly filings data are
not significantly different, find that the variance in the number of monthly filings in the pre- and post-Dura
time periods are significantly different at p < 0.01 (“ ”), and p < 0.001 (“ ”)for the one year and two year†† †††  
time frames, respectively. See generally DUNCAN CRAMER, ADVANCED QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
146-50 (2003).
171. E.g., Emergent, 343 F.3d at 198 (“[I]nflation of purchase price alone cannot satisfy loss
causation.”).
172. Additional support for this interpretation is sustained by filings data for the Eleventh and Third
Circuits (discussed supra Part II.A), which both experienced increases or no change in the number of class
actions filed in comparing the pre- and post-Dura 6 month and one year time periods. The Third Circuit
had 8 “classic” filings in the six months prior to Dura, 11 in the six months after the decision. There were
18 filings in the year prior to the decision and 18 in the year following the decision. The Eleventh Circuit
had similar results, 1 filing in the 6 months preceding the decision, and 7 filings in the six months
afterward. There were 12 filings the year prior to the decision and 13 the following year. Both Circuits
experienced declines in comparisons of the two-year period. See Appendix.
173. See supra note 165.
that the six month, one year, and two year declines in the number of filings
were all statistically significant.170
Table 4 provides data for the Second Circuit to be compared with the data
in Table 3 for the Ninth Circuit. Clearinghouse data shows that filings in
jurisdictions employing strict pleading standards prior to Dura, like the
Second Circuit,  appear to have continued as if little had changed.171 172
TABLE 4173






t - 2 years 88
t - 1 year 52
t - 0.5 year 27
t + 0.5 year 21 -22.22%
t + 1 year 36 -30.77%
t + 2 years 65 -26.14% 
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174. Exceptions for the two-year time frame include the Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and DC Circuits, all
of which represent a small proportion of total filing activity. See Appendix.
175. Cases settling within four years of the filing date dropped by 6.33%.
176. See Choi, supra note 111, at 1496-97.
177. Id. at 1497 (“. . . cases settling within one year of the filing date, representing potentially
Generally, the number of federal filings has decreased in most circuits in
the two years following the decision.  However, the Second Circuit’s174
application of loss causation doctrine embraced in Dura, prior to the decision,
did not produce as severe declines as the Ninth Circuit. Statistical tests
establish that none of the declines for the Second Circuit was statistically
significant in comparing the difference in means or variance of monthly filings
data.
B. Settlements
As Table 5 displays, analysis of settlements data for the 4-year time
period surrounding the Dura decision shows that the fraction of cases settling
within 3 years of the original filing date decreased 14.46% post-Dura.  To175
the extent that defendants settle frivolous lawsuits to avoid the high cost of
defending such actions, those settlements should occur relatively quickly after
the filing of a suit.  From the data, one could infer that the Court’s explicit176
concern with strike suits, which arguably factored into the calculus of the
Dura decision, may have suppressed the filing of some frivolous litigation.
TABLE 5
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS SETTLED W ITHIN 4  YEARS OF FILING
FOR THE TW O YEARS PRE- AND POST-DURA
Time from Filing
to Settlement
% of Total Cases
Settled Pre-Dura
% of Total Cases
Settled Post-Dura Difference
Within 3 Years 50.26% 43.00% -14.46%
Within 4 Years 69.11% 64.73%   -6.33%
In addition, the mean and median settlement amounts increased as the
amount of time between filing and settlement increased. Cases settling within
the first few years of filing, possibly representing frivolous suits, thus tend to
settle for the lowest amount of money.  The findings in Tables 5 and 6177
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frivolous suits, settled for the lowest amount of money, which supports the hypothesis that defendants settle
such suits quickly to rid themselves of the nuisance of defending the suit”).
178. Id.
179. Bebchuk, supra note 114, at 441.
180. Two-tailed, t-tests for the two samples with unequal variance were significant at p < 0.05 (“*”)
for the two-year period. In addition, an F test finds that the variance in the settlement amounts for the 2
years pre- and post-Dura are significantly different at p < 0.001 (“ ”). See supra note 170.†††
support the hypothesis that defendants settle these suits quickly to rid
themselves of the nuisance and associated costs of defending such suits.  The178
higher total average and median settlements post-Dura could stem from an
overall decline in frivolous, or negative expected value suits, which have been
shown to reduce the settlement amounts offered to plaintiffs with positive
expected value suits and consequently increases the proportion of those suits
that go to trial.  The average settlement for the 2-year pre-Dura period was179
$29.13 million. The average settlement for the same period, post-Dura, was
$64.52 million, a statistically significant increase.180
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TABLE 6
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEM ENTS





















0 - 1 year 1 $1.70 $1.70 1 $9.00 $9.00
1 - 2 years 30 $15.82 $5.28 32 $8.19 $3.16
2 - 3 years 65 $27.56 $6.00 56 $45.45 $6.88
3 - 4 years 36 $33.15 $8.11 45 $118.84 $7.00
4 - 5 years 26 $34.91 $5.99 38 $40.17 $8.88
5 - 6 years 23 $47.74 $7.00 19 $118.06 $15.00
6 - 7 years 7 $12.39 $4.50 4 $312.63 $101.50
7 - 8 years 3 $3.67 $2.50 8 $18.97 $12.03
8 - 9 years 0 - - 1 $10.50 $10.50
9 - 10 years 0 - - 2 $4.15 $4.15
10 - 11 years 0 - - 1 $0.75 $0.75
Total 191 $29.13 $6.33 207 $64.52 $7.00
Generally, the average and median settlements also increased post-Dura
for each of the periods demonstrated above. Near the 7-year mark after the
original filing, however, settlement amounts tend to decline significantly; this
implies a ceiling with regard to length of litigation resulting in monetary
returns for class members. One possible explanation, despite larger litigation
costs as a result of the longer time-frame, may be that both parties tend to
realize a lower probability of the suit having a positive expected value,
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181. See Bebchuk, supra note 114, at 440-41 (suggesting that the “higher the probability attached
by the defendant to the suit being a PEV suit, and the greater the defendant’s litigation costs, then the
greater the amount that the plaintiff will succeed in extracting”).
182. See id. at 437.
resulting in a drop in the amount that the plaintiff can extract.  Changes in181
relative uncertainty and informational asymmetry over longer periods of time
may somehow favor defendants. This might be the case because either the
chances of winning at trial are small or because the expected judgment is
small relative to the expended litigation costs, and both parties have come to
such a conclusion.182
Lastly, Table 7 demonstrates the number of settlements occurring in the
lower dollar amounts, ten million dollars and less. Remarkably, almost every
settlement category was reduced in comparisons of the 2 years before and
after the Court’s decision. Most notably there were 18 settlements in the two
years preceding Dura that settled for $1 million or less of 191 total
settlements. Following the Court’s opinion, there were only 14 similar
settlements out of 207 total settlements, a 28.23% decline in the fraction of
cases settling for less than one million dollars.
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183. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347-48 (internal citation omitted).
184. Katz, supra note 114, at 17.
TABLE 7













$1,000,000 9.42% 6.76% -28.23%
$2,000,000 16.75% 16.43% -1.96%
$3,000,000 25.65% 25.60% -0.20%
$4,000,000 32.98% 33.82% 2.52%
$5,000,000 41.88% 40.58% -3.12%
$6,000,000 48.69% 47.34% -2.77%
$7,000,000 55.50% 51.21% -7.73%
$8,000,000 59.16% 55.07% -6.91%
$9,000,000 62.83% 57.97% -7.73%
$10,000,000 65.97% 59.90% -9.19%
These relatively small settlement values may well represent a sample of
“largely groundless claim[s]” that the Dura holding sought to prevent,
representing no more than an “in terrorem increment of the settlement
value.”  Under that assumption, Dura appears to have reduced the filing of183
strike suits, by weeding out such cases at the pleading stage. This result is
consistent with Katz’s model, discussed supra Part IV.A, in that Dura’s
enhanced pleading requirements increase the fraction of total litigation costs
incurred when filing, resulting in a reduction of strike or frivolous suits (i.e.,
those with extremely low or negative expected settlement values).  The184
settlements data in the aggregate supports the hypothesis that Dura has likely
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185. Contra Kaufman, supra note 28, at 1.
186. See, e.g., Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 5 REV. ACCT. STUD. 217 (2000) (investigating the reaction of stock prices
to the enactment of the PSLRA).
187. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 347; THOMAS BLILEY, SEC. LITIG. REFORM CONF. REP., H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 104-369, at 2, 23 (1995).
188. In certain circumstances, the expected return of pursuit does not exceed the expected costs that
warrant filing against some companies that may have engaged in fraud. Cf. Choi, supra note 111, at 1472
(discussing how the PSLRA may have reduced the impact of frivolous litigation while possibly also acting
reduced the number of frivolous settlements resulting in an increase in the
average and median settlements post-Dura, a reduction in the number of
filings settling relatively quickly, and fewer settlements under ten million
dollars.
VII. CONCLUSION
Filings and settlements data for securities class actions indicate that Dura
was anything but inconsequential.  Rather, empirical evidence finds that the185
decision, ceteris paribus, has had a statistically significant impact on both
ends of the securities litigation process. Post-Dura the number of class action
filings has declined, the average settlement amount has increased, and the
number of lower and relatively quick settlements has declined. As an indirect
measure or proxy for strike suits, these results collectively indicate that the
decision has reduced the amount of frivolous class action securities litigation.
Potential avenues for future research include event studies of firms
involved in pending 10b-5 class action litigation to determine if they
experienced a positive return as a result of the Court’s April 2005 decision.186
In addition, examination of disclosure-related losses with respect to filings
may lend support to the proposition that plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to be
avoiding cases lacking market corroboration in the form of a price decline as
a result of the Dura rule.
Like the PSLRA before it, Dura seeks to reduce abusive litigation and
coercive settlements,  and this study indicates that the decision seems to be187
working. Plaintiffs can no longer merely allege that a defendant’s
misrepresentations caused the price of a security to be artificially inflated and
succeed in extracting settlement, as cases are easily dismissed that do not
plead a market decline following a corrective disclosure. While findings
reveal conclusively that the number of federal securities class actions has
declined post-Dura, the possibility exists that the decision may also have
chilled some meritorious litigation.  As a result, what seemed to be simply188
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to chill meritorious litigation).
189. But see Coffee, Litigation, supra note 106, at 1 (noting that Dura “initially seemed only a
Pyrrhic Defeat for plaintiffs . . . more symbolic than real and has little real cost to the losing side”).
190. See Fox, Demystifying Causation, supra note 8, at 525.
191. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 347-48.
a “Pyrrhic Defeat” for plaintiffs may have in fact been more real and less
symbolic than initially anticipated.  The question is whether the benefit of189
imposing the loss causation requirement of a drop in price at the time of
disclosure is worth the cost of blocking arguably meritorious suits.  The190
Court in Dura decided that it is.191
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192. Where t = 4/19/2005, the date of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
APPENDIX192
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS PRE- AND POST-DURA
TOTAL FILINGS BY CIRCUIT
Time
Period 1st 2d 3d 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th DC
t - 2 years 24 88 38 12 27 14 24 13 114 10 34 2
t - 1 year 8 52 18 6 17 9 11 6 77 7 12 1
t - 0.5 year 7 27 8 1 4 5 6 2 34 4 1 0
t + 0.5 year 5 21 11 5 5 5 4 9 9 6 7 1
t + 1 year 5 36 18 8 9 11 8 14 19 7 13 1
t + 2 years 11 65 26 12 19 12 9 17 56 11 26 3
